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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff ^Respondent, 
vs. 
ROMEO ALDO BEORCHIA, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This was a criminal case brought by the State against 
defendant-appellant Romeo Aldo Beorchia, charging him 
with possession of a dangerous weapon in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (1953). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
At a jury trial before the Honorable VeNoy Chiis-
tofferson, defendant was found guilty as charged. De-
fendant was given a suspended sentence of not more 
than five years in the Utah State Prison conditioned 
upon the satisfactory completion of his probation. 
Case No. 
13729 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent requests that the finding in the lower 
court be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On or about January 17, 1974, the defendant was 
visited in his apartment in Logan, Utah, by Allen Gines, 
a member of the Logan City Police Dept; Jay Crockett, 
a member of the sheriff's office, Bill Rich of the F. B J . 
and Sheriff Darius Carter (T. 24). The purpose of the 
visit was to effect the arrest of defendant's brother as a 
deserter. 
While in the apartment the law enforcement people 
observed a .38 caliber pistol hanging from defendant's 
bed board and a box of shells nearby (T. 25). Officer 
Gines copied the serial number of the weapon on his 
hand and ran an NCIC check on the weapon (T. 26, T. 
30). The check was negative (T. 30). I t was later de-
termined that the gun had previously disappeared from 
Al's Sporting Goods, Inc., Logan, Utah, and was pre-
sumed to have been stolen (T. 46-47). 
They also observed a loaded 20 gauge shotgun hang-
ing on a wall in the apartment (T. 29). 
Officer Gines and two other officers returned to the 
apartment with a search warrant (T. 32). The officers 
seized the shotgun but were unable to locate the revolver 
(T. 32). When questioned as to the whereabouts of the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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revolver, defendant testified that he had lost the weapon 
while hunting (T. 97). 
POINT I. 
APPELLANT'S JURY WAS P R O P E R L Y 
CONSTITUTED. 
In Utah, the jury selection is usually made from 
voter registration rolls. Selection use to be from prop-
erty lists. However, due to the fact that many qualified 
persons were being excluded from selection, the change 
was made to voter lists. The respondent claims that this 
is the best feasible system for selection of a cross-section 
of the coocnmunity. The appellant claims that this system 
creates unwarranted exclusion of some persons. Yet, he 
has not offered any workable alternative. Until a rea-
sonable substitute is found, the current system must be 
used and accepted. 
The jury selection system does not need to be a 
perfect cross-section of the community. No matter what 
the system, there will be some persons excluded. The 
United States Supreme Court has indicated that sources 
such as voter registration lists are adequate for the pro-
cess of jury selection. In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 
202, 13 L. Ed. 759, 85 S. Ct. 824, reh. den., 381 U. S. 921, 
14 L. Ed. 2d 442, 85 S. Ct. 1528 (1965) a negro was con-
victed of rape by an all white jury. He claimed that 
negroes had been systematically excluded from the jury. 
The sources of jury lists were city directories, registra-
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tion lists, club and church lists, conversations, and ac-
quaintances from which male jurors were selected. The 
court indicated the fact that negroes seldom served on 
juries was not enough to assume improper selection. "But 
purposeful discrimination may not be assumed or merely 
asserted." Id. at 764. The Court upheld the jury selec-
tion process of Alabama even though some classes were 
excluded. 
"Neither the jury roll nor the venire need 
be a perfect mirror of the community or accur-
ately reflect the proportionate strength of ev-
ery identifyable group." Id. at 766. 
In Utah, non-citizens and non-taxpayers are ex-
cluded from juries. Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-8 (1953), as 
amended. In North Carolina juries were chosen from 
property tax and poll tax lists Non-citizens as well as 
non-taxpayers were excluded from juries. Brown v. Allen, 
344 U. S. 443, 97 L. Ed. 469, 73 S. Ct. 397 (1953) said: 
"States should decide for themselves the 
quality of their juries as best fits their situation 
so long as the classifications have relation to 
the efficiency of the jurors and are equally ad-
ministered." Id. at 498. 
The Court held that this method of jury selection was 
an appropriate cross-section determination means. 
Many other states have similar jury selection stat-
utes to that of Utah's. Some of them are as follows: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Deerings Gal. Civ. Proc. Code § 198; Idaho Code 1948 
§ 2-201; Iowa Code 1950 § 607.1; Montana Rev. Code 
1947 § 93-1301. 
The cases cited by the appellant do not conflict with 
the respondent's position. Glasser v. United States, 315 
U, S. 60, 86 L. Ed. 680, 62 S. Ct. 457 (1942), is a case 
where all women were excluded from juries unless they 
had taken League of Women Voters5 jury classes. Such 
exclusion resulted in a clear distinction of the community 
cross-section. This inequity could dearly be remedied. 
In our case no clear distortion of the community cross-
section exists and no better system is readily apparent. 
The appellant claims that Reese, et al. v. Knott, 3 
Utah 4G6, 24 P. 757, a 1861 case, is still good law. This 
is obviously inaccurate. Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-8 (1953), 
as amended, was drafted long after Reese and operates 
as a clear outline for voter qualification. 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 88 S. Ct. 144, 
20 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1968), simply does not belong in our 
case. The question in that case was whether or not a 
jury trial was a right in misdemeanor cases punishable 
by imprisonment. We need not concern ourselves whether 
or not appellant had a right to jury trial since he was 
given a jury trial. The right was satisfied. 
Appellant has argued that since 42 U. S. C. § 1981 
applies to aliens as well as negroes that aliens should 
be given places on juries. Furthermore, he states that 
this inclusion should extend to 18 U. S. C. § 243. These 
arguments are unsupportable. Although 42 U. S. C. § 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1981 does apply to aliens there is no language in that 
section to indicate that the jury selection is one of the 
rights. That section reads: 
"All persons within the jurisdiction of the 
United States shall have the same right in ev-
ery State and Territory to make and enforce 
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and 
to the full and equal benefit of all laws and 
proceedings for the security of persons and 
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and 
shall be subject to like punishment, pains, pen-
alties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every 
kind, and to no other." 
It should be noted that the section specifically says it 
applies to "all persons." None of the rights mentioned 
in 42 U. S. C. § 1981 have been denied appellant. 
In contrast, 18 U. S. C. § 243 makes a specific rule 
for juries. It even says that it only applies to citizens: 
"No citizen possessing all other quali-
fications which are or may be prescribed by 
law shall be disqualified for service as grand or 
petit juror in any court of the United States, or 
of any State on account of race, color, or pre-
vious condition of servitude; and whoever, be-
ing an officer or other person charged with any 
duty or fails to summon any citizen for such 
cause, shall be fined not more than $5,000." 
There is no foundation for saying that the rule in Roberto 
v. Hartford Fire Insurance, 177 F. 2d 811, cert, den., 339 
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U. S. 929 (1949) extends inclusion of aliens under the jury 
composition section, 18 U. S. C. § 243. In part that de-
cision reads: 
"Although enacted primarily to insure 
equal civil rights to negroes, it has been held 
that protection of this section (42 U.S.C. 
| 1981) extends to aliens as well as citizens." 
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 814. 
Those other cases which have been cited by appel-
lant under Point I are of no concern to this case. Purdy 
and Fitzpatrick v. State, 456 P. 2d 645, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77 
(1969), and In Re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, 37 L. Ed. 2d 
910, 93 S. a . 2851 (1973). 
POINT II. 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED IN THE LOWER COURT 
FROM WHICH THE JURY COULD AND 
DID CORRECTLY FIND DEFENDANT 
GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF POSSESSION 
OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON BY ONE NOT 
A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES. 
The Utah State Legislature passed legislation pro-
hibiting a non-citizen from owning, or having in his cus-
tody or control a dangerous weapon: 
"Any person who is not a citizen of the 
United States or any person who has been 
convicted of any crime of violence under the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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laws of the United States, the state of Utah, 
or any other state government, or country, or 
who is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug, 
or any person who has been declared mentally 
incompetent shall not own or have in his pos-
session or under his custody or control any 
dangerous weapon as defined in this part. Any 
person who violates this section is guilty of a 
class A misdemeanor, and if the dangerous 
weapon is a firearm or sawed-off shotgun he 
shall be guilty of a felony of the trird degree." 
(Emphasis added) Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
503 (1953) 
In its case against defendant, the state presented 
the following evidence: 
Allen Gines, a police officer for Logan City, testified 
that while lawfully in defendant's apartment on a police 
matter, he saw a Smith and Wesson four-inch barrel .38 
Cobat Masterpiece revolver on a headboard above the 
defendant's bed (T. 26). Officer Gines further testified 
that he copied the serial number of the weapon, 5K7344, 
on the palm of his hand (T. 26). I t was later deter-
mined that a weapon bearing that same serial number 
had been stolen from ATs Sporting Goods Incorporated, 
Logan, Utah (T. 47). 
Deputy Jay Crockett, who accompanied Officer 
Gines, also testified that he observed a revolver hanging 
from the bed board in defendant's bedroom (T. 36). 
Both witnesses testified that they obeserved a loaded 
shotgun in defendant's apartment (T. 29 and T. 36). 
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Officer Gines further testified that he returned to 
defendant's apartment with a search warrant and found 
the shotgun but was unable to locate the revolver (T. 
32). In questioning the defendant as to the whereabouts 
of the revolver, Officer Gines testified defendant re-
sponded that he (defendant) had lost the revolver while 
hunting (T. 97). 
Evidence of defendant's non-citizenship took the form 
of defendant's immigrant visa. A certified copy of the 
visa was received into evidence (T. 20). 
From the above it is clear that sufficient evidence 
of the crime charged was before the jury. See: State 
v. Laub, 102 Utah 402, 131 P. 2d 805 (1942); State v. 
Thatcher, 108 Utah 63, 157 P. 2d 258 (1945); State v. 
Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P. 2d 246 (1970). 
POINT III. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-503 DOES NOT 
VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL 
PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 
There is an inherent power within every sovereignty 
to exercise police power for the good of the public. Nebbia 
v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 54 S. Ot. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940 
(1934), states: 
"The Fifth Amendment, in the field of 
feleral activity, and the Fourteenth, as respects 
state action, do not prohibit governmental 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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regulation for the public welfare. They merely 
condition the exertion of the admitted power, 
by securing that the end shall be accomplished 
by methods consistent with due process and 
the guaranty of due process, as has often been 
held, deams only that the law shall not be 
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that 
means selected shall have a real and substantial 
relation to the object sought to be obtained." 
Id. at 
Control of the use of firarms and weapons has frequently 
been held to be an appropriate subject of exercise of 
police power. State v. Hart, 66 Idaho 217, 157 P. 2d 72 
(1945); Watson v. Stone, 148 Fla. 516, 4 So. 2d 700 
(1941); Ex Parte Rameriz, 193 Cal. 633, 226 P. 914 
(1924); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138, 34 S. 
Ot. 281, 58 L. Ed. 539 (1914); People v. Cannizaro, 138 
Cal. App. 28 (1934); State v. Rheame, 80 N. H. 319, 116 
A. 758 (1922). 
The appellant claims that classifications in regard 
to firearms are to be judged under a standard of "strict 
scrutiny." This is an incorrect standard in our case. In 
special circumstances the United States Supreme Court 
has indicated that a close examination of the law is re-
quired. Loving v. Virginia, 383 U. S. 1 (1966), indicates 
what kinds of cases require "strict scrutiny." 
"The cases involving suspect classifica-
tions discriminated against however the court 
has adopted an attitude of vigorous scrutiny 
of the law." Jd. at 5 
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An examination of the cases which appellant cites 
give an indication of what kinds of cases involve "suspect 
classifications" and "fundamental interests," Takahashi 
v. Fish and Game Comm'n., 334 U. S. 410, 92 L. Ed. 
1478, 68 S. Ct. 1138 (1948), and Purdy and Fitzpatrick 
v. State, 456 P. 2d 645, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1969), and In 
Re Griffiths, 413 U. S. 717, 37 L. Ed. 2d 910,93 S. Ct. 2851 
(1973), all indicate that there is a fundamental interest 
involved when it concerns the right to earn a living. The 
Takahashi aliens were prohibited from obtaining com-
mercial fishing licenses so that they could earn a living 
in that manner. In Purdy, employment by aliens on the 
public works was prohibited. In Griffiths entrance to 
the practice of law was limited to non-aliens. In these 
cases, the right to earn a living was considered so im-
portant that the courts looked at the statutes involved 
with "strict scrutiny." In each case the court decided 
that the statutes had no good basis for support in light 
of the important right of employment. I t should be noted 
that all of the cases which appellant has cited concerning 
the striking down of state statutes because of dassifica-
tion of aliens are employment cases. I t might be assumed 
that since employment cases are the only ones in which 
the courts strike down classifications against aliens, all 
other classifications against aliens are justified. 
In Korematsu v. United States, 232 U. S. 214, 65 
S. Ct. 193, 89 L. Ed. 194 (1944), it was held that legal 
restrictions which curtain civil rights of a single racial 
group are "suspect classifications." In Fugii v. State, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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242 P. 2d 617 (1952), a state statute purported to re-
strict all non-citizens. The court found that there was 
a "suspect classification^ involved since the law only 
effectively restricted a single race (Japanese). There 
is no case authority to the effect that the broad class 
of aliens is to be treated under "suspect classification" 
rules. Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663, 86 
S. Ct. 1079, 16 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1966), provides an excel-
lent indication of the situations that involve fundamental 
interests. Harper indicated that the right to vote is a 
fundamental right. The court said: 
"We have long been mindful that where 
fundamental rights and liberties are asserted 
under the Equal Protection clause, classifica-
tions which might invade or restrain them must 
be closely scrutinized and carefully confined." 
Id. at 174. 
The court then went on to give the following examples 
of fundamental rights: Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. 8. 
535, 541, 86 L. Ed. 1655,1660, 62 S. Ct. 110 (1942), (Right 
of pracreation and marriage); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 
U. S. 533, 561-562, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506, 527, 84 S. Ct. 1362 
(1963), (Right to vote); Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U. S. 
107, 15 L. Ed. 2d 620, 86 S. Ct. 760 (1966), (Right to 
trial by Jury); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536, 580-581, 
13 L. Ed. 2d 471, 501-2, 86 S. Ct. 453 (1965), Right to 
peaceably assemble); and Carrington v. Bash, 380 U. S. 
89, 13 L. Ed. 2d 675, 85 S. Ct. 775 (1965), (Right to 
vote). 
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Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 
22 L. Ed. 2d 500 (1969), indicates an additional funda-
mental right of interstate travel. See also, Dunn v. 
Blumstien, 405 U. S. 330, 92 S. Ct. 955 (1972). 
The restriction in our case does not involve a "fun-
damental right" or a "suspect classification." There is 
no authority which indicates that possession of firearms 
is a "fundamental right." Most "fundamental rights" 
which have been found thus far are First Amendment 
Rights. Possession of firearms is not one of the enumer-
ated First Amendment Rights. Restrictions against 
aliens as a broad class have never been formed to be a 
"suspect classification." 
Since our case does not qualify for "strict scrutiny," 
a different test is necessary. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U. 
S. 68, 20 L. Ed. 2d 436, 88 S. Ct. 1508 (1968), indicates 
that when a classification is made against a class of per-
sons the test is to be a "rational" test. The Court said: 
"In applying the Equal Protection Clause 
to social and economic legislation we give great 
latitude to the legislature in making classifi-
cations." Id, at 439. 
When applying the "rational" test the Court has exer-
cised judicial restraint unless the basis for the classifica-
tion is obviously invidious, imreasonable, arbitrary and 
capricious. This standard seldom results in the overturn-
ingof statutes. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 
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336 U. S. 106, 69 S. Ct. 463, 93 L. Ed. 533 (1949); Goesaert 
v. Cleary, 335 U. S. 464 (1948); Daniel v. Family Sec. 
Life Ins. Co., 336 U. S. 220 (1949); Kotch v. Board of 
River Port Pilot Comm'nrs, 330 U. S. 552 (1947); Mc-
Gowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 (1961). 
The rational basis for supporting Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-503 has been expounded in other cases where 
similar statutes have been challenged. In California, a 
restriction against aliens carrying firearms was chal-
lenged on the same basis as appellant has. Ex Parte 
Rameriz, supra. In upholding the statutes the Court 
said: 
I t appears therefore, that, although state 
constitutions declare that every citizen has the 
right to bear arms, in defense of himself and 
the state and do not expressly or by implica-
tion deny to the legislature the right to enact 
laws in regard to the manner in which arms 
shall be borne, this can be done. . ." Id. at 922. 
In Patsone v. Pennsylvania, supra, an act made it un-
lawful for foreign born persons to carry shotguns or 
rifles. The United States Supreme Court upheld the 
statute. They said: 
"But we start with the general considera-
tion that a state may classify with reference 
to the evil to be prevented and that if the class 
discriminated against is or reasonably might 
be considered to define those from whom the 
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evil mainly is to be feared, it properly may 
be picked out. . . 
• • • 
"The state may direct its law against what 
it deems the evil as it actually exists without 
covering the whole field of possible abuses." 
Id. at 543. 
See also People v. Cannizaro, supra. 
In the above cases the courts assumed a rational basis 
for the classification. In State v. Rheame, 116 A. 758, 
80 N. H. 319, the court gave rationale for deciding that 
there was a rational basis for a law making it unlawful 
for aliens to possess firearms. Firearms are dangerous and 
there is a great temptation for their use by those who 
possess them. Domicile, allegiance to the country, and 
other such characteristics distinguish aliens from citizens. 
Since aliens do not have allegiance to the government, 
there is a danger that some will arm themselves and put 
themselves in a position to dispute the sovereignty of 
our nation and our people. While such a danger seemed 
improbable at the time of this case, the court said that 
in a time of war it becomes a real danger if aliens were 
to organize. Citizens as a class are more settled and are 
better known to local police. Aliens are usually temporar-
ily in this country and their abode while here is capri-
cious and uncertain. Citizens bear tax burdens which 
pay the cost of police protection while aliens do not 
necessarily bear this burden. Aliens have no obligation, 
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as do citizens, to defend the state and maintenance of 
order. 
All of the above cases support the proMbition of 
possession of firearms by aliens as an appropriate police 
power designed to protect the order, safety, health, mor-
als, and general welfare of the areas involved. Accord-
ingly* Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 is a constitutional law 
under the United States Constitution. 
POINT IV. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-503 DOES NOT 
VIOLATE THE APPELLANT'S RIGHTS UN-
DER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH. 
The appellant argues that since Art. I, § 7 of the 
Constitution of Utah is a summary of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution, 
Utah law has also been violated. However, as discussed 
in Point III, federal constitutional law has not been vio-
lated. Therefore, it follows that Utah constitutional law 
has not been violated. 
POINT V. 
LAWS REGULATING ALIENS HAVE NOT 
BEEN PRE-EMPTED BY THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT. 
As an introduction to the area of pre-emption, Hart 
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and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal Sys-
tem (1953), 435 say: 
"Federal law is generally interstitial in 
nature, it rarely occupies a legal field com-
pletely . . . Federal legislation, on the whole, 
has been conceived and drafted on an ad hoc 
basis to accomplish limited objectives. I t builds 
upon legal relationships established by the 
states, altering or supplanting them only so 
far as necessary for the special purpose." 
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U. S. 497 (1956), and 
Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218 (1947), 
set for a test for deciding if pre-emption has taken place. 
First, the court must decide the purpose of Congress. 
Then, looking at that purpose, there is pre-emption only 
if Congress has left no room for a state to supplant the 
legislation if the field is so federally dominant that it is 
assumed to preclude states, or if the state result is in-
consistent and conflicting. 
In Kelly v. Washington, 302 U. S. 1, 82 L. Ed. 3 
(1937), the Court held that enforcement of a state law 
requiring safety inspection of tugs was not barred by 
enactment of the federal Motor Boat Act of 1910. The 
Court said: 
"States are thus enabled to deal with 
local exigencies and to exert in the absence of 
conflict with federal legislation an essential 
protective power [although interstate com-
merce may be effected] and when Congress 
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does exercise its paramount authority, it is 
obvious that Congress may determine how far 
its regulation shall go. There is no constitu-
tional rule which compels Congress to occupy 
the whole field. Congress may circumscribe 
its regulation and occupy only a limited field. 
When it does so, state regulation outside that 
limited field and otherwise admissible is not 
forbidden or displaced. The principal is thor-
oughly established that the exercise by the 
State of its police power, which would be valid 
if not superseded by federal action, is super-
seded only where the repugnance or conflict 
is so 'direct and positive' that the two acts 
cannot be reconciled and consistently stand 
together." Id. at 10. 
See also California Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. 
Paul, 373 U. S. 132 (1963). 
Purdy and Fitzpatrick v. State, supra, Takahashi v. 
Fish and Game Comm'm., 334 U. S. 410, 92 L. Ed. 1478, 
68 S. Ot. 1138 (1948), Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S, 
66, 61 S. Ot. 399, 85 L. Ed. 581 (1941), and Zschenig v. 
Miller, 389 U. S. 429, 19 L. Ed. 2d 683, 88 S. Ct. 664 
(1968), as cited by appellant show occasions where there 
was a real conflict between state law and federal alien 
law. In Purdy and Takahashi, employment was denied 
aliens in certain classes of work. This directly discour-
aged immigration and naturalization because aliens would 
not go to those places where they could not secure a liv-
ing. In Hines, the court also decided that aliens would 
be discouraged from immigrating under state law requir-
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ing registration. A complete scheme of registration had 
already been established by the federal government. In 
Zschenig it was found that an Oregon law directly con-
flicted with the contents of an existing treaty. 
In our case, there is no reason to believe that immi-
gration will be discouraged by Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
503. Aliens can still be employed in Utah. Utah has no 
special registration requirements. Our gun control law 
does not conflict with any existing treaty. The purpose 
of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, 8 
U. S. C. § 1011 (1952), is to promote immigration and 
naturalization of aliens. Utah law does not conflict with, 
supplant, or effect that federal purpose. 
18 U. S. C. App. 1201 and 1202 does not pre-empt 
the whole field of firarm control. This is obvious in light 
of the numerous state regulations which are based on 
aspects of control of use of firearms (e.g., assault, rob-
bery), etc. The fact that Utah has enacted a statute 
making it unlawful for aliens to possess weapons does 
not enter into a field pre-empted by 18 U. S. C. App. 
1201, 1202. There is absolutely no conflict presented. 
The federal law prohibits possession of firearms by aliens 
who are illegally in the country. Utah law also prohibits 
possession by aliens who are illegally in the country and 
extends the prohibition to all other aliens. 
All other arguments advanced by the appellant in 
regard to pre-emption are frivolous and without meaning 
here. Utah has enacted a statute which does not con-
flict with any federal statute. The federal government 
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has not indicated any desire to occupy the whole field of 
firearm control or alien treatment. Federal legislation 
in these areas is limited and thereby the police power 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 is an area unoccupied 
and not superseded by the federal government. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons respondent prays this court 
sustain the jury verdict of guilty. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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